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5 Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO 
and its location on the Cusp 
From coherence to incoherence? 
Amnon Aran 
Introduction 
Travelling the short distance between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv is, in a nutshell, 
a journey along Israel’s location, on the cusp between three regions: the Middle 
East, Western Europe and North America. Tel-Aviv, renowned for its Bauhaus 
architecture, its European-style cafes, and its vibrant business community, 
embodies Israel’s embedding in Western Europe and North America. 
Jerusalem, a poor, segregated, and deeply religious city, projects the enduring 
Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel’s rootedness in the politico-military landscape 
of the modern Middle East. However, as this chapter aims to show, the impact 
of straddling three regions goes beyond their effects on these cities. It bears on 
Israeli politics, economics, society, culture and foreign policy. 
 The focus of this chapter, which is divided into three sections, is on the 
changing relationship between Israel’s position on the cusp between three 
regions, and its foreign policy towards the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The first section analyses Israel’s 
position on the cusp and what this entails for the security, state-ideology, 
economics and institutions. The second section examines Israeli foreign policy 
towards the PLO and the PA during and after the Cold War in the context of its 
position on the cusp between the Middle East, Europe and North America. It is 
argued that during the Cold War, and especially since the early 1970s, Israel 
adopted a hard-line stance towards the PLO that was compatible with this 
position, but that the end of the Cold War introduced certain tensions. The 
choice of this timeline is informed by the assumption that the end of the Cold 
War removed the bi-polar structure, which enhanced the role of regional 
dynamics. By extension, the effect of being located on the cusp was enhanced 
as well. The third section explores the responses of key Israeli foreign policy-
makers, Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Binyamin Netanyahu, and Foreign 
Minister Shimon Peres, to these emerging tensions. The fourth section 
investigates the degree to which the stances advocated by each of these 
statesmen proved useful for dealing with the relationship between the effects 
generated by Israel’s location on the cusp and its foreign policy towards the 
PLO/PA. 
Mapping Israel’s location on the cusp 
The notion of states simultaneously being pushed and pulled by two or more 
subsystems is intriguing. However, identifying their boundaries, the forces and 
effects they generate, and how these subsystems affect foreign policy, is far 
from straightforward. Take, for example, the Middle East regional subsystem. 
Tripp (1994) demonstrates that the regional international institutions (e.g. the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League) are designed not to foster 
cooperation in the region, but to protect member states from political, 
economic and military threats. Also, trade, another common constituent of 
regionalism, does not figure prominently in the Middle East. The main regional 
trading countries – the rich Gulf states, Israel, and Turkey – trade more with 
external powers and economic blocs than inter-regionally (Halliday 2005: 261–
99). 
 Common norms, culture and identity also have not produced a binding 
effect. In fact, the pan-regional projects espoused by Pan-Arabism in the 1950s 
and 1960s and, later, the notion of an Islamic Umma (nation) transcending 
states and unifying the region, have generated considerably more rivalry than 
cooperation between states. The Pan-Arabism of the 1950s and 1960s pitted 
conservative monarchies and Arab republics against each other (Dawisha 
2005). Subsequently, and especially since the 1979 Iranian revolution, 
politicization of the notion of a Muslim Umma, and ensuing conflicts over who 
should lead it, have fuelled intra- and inter-state conflicts, especially in the 
Gulf region (Gause 2010). 
 Thus, the Middle East lacks many of the binding features identified by 
theories of regionalism: social and economic exchange, the links generated by 
economic integration, regional institutions, and a common identity (Hurrel 
2007). However, in one central respect – security – the Middle East can be seen 
as a subsystem or, as Buzan and Waever (2003) describe it, a regional security 
complex. The idea of a regional security complex is based on the simple 
proposal that most threats travel more easily over short distances. Hence, 
interdependence related to security usually involves regionally based clusters 
or security complexes, which are defined and shaped by three key factors: the 
territorially bounded states comprising the region, distribution of material 
power, and the political process by which security issues are constituted (ibid.: 
4). The emergence of a Middle Eastern regional security complex is a major 
manifestation of what Hurrell (2007) refers to as ‘regional consolidation – 
when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states of that 
region and the rest of the world, and forms the organizing basis for policy 
within the region’ (Hurrel 2007: 1). 
 The Arab-Israeli conflict is an important component of the Middle 
Eastern regional security complex. Given its central role in focusing, 
amplifying, and, in some cases, defining the transnational qualities of Arab 
Nationalism and political Islam, it provides the Middle Eastern regional 
security complex with coherence. Consequently, strong rhetorical support for 
the Palestinians has been intrinsic to the legitimacy of regimes extending from 
Morocco to Oman. Likewise, security dynamics across wide distances were 
linked by the conflict. The several Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1969–
70, 1973, 1982), and the major configurations between Israel and the PLO, 
Hezbollah and Hamas (1982, 2006, 2008–09 respectively) involved more 
distant clashing entities and countries. To some degree, all the Arab countries 
have been involved, if only rhetorically, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many 
countries (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Tunisia) have provided 
economic, military and political support to the Palestinians (Sayigh 1997). 
 Thus, both symbolically and materially, the Arab-Israeli conflict has 
linked a wide geographic spread of Arab and Islamic states to Israel (Buzan 
and Waever 2003: 193). Therefore, it could be argued, Israel is rooted in a 
hostile regional security complex, which exhibits the features of a Westphalian 
modern state system of interstate insecurity generated by territorial disputes, 
ideological competition, power and status rivalries, ethnic and cultural 
divisions, and disputes over material resources (ibid.: 194). 
 At the same time, in several respects Israel can be seen as gravitating 
towards other subsystems. For example, during the first 20 years of its 
existence, the various underpinnings of Zionism – the state ideology – derived 
from late nineteenth century European secular nationalist ideologies (Avineri 
1981). In institutional terms, Israel exhibited a formal (although imperfect) 
system of democratic processes and structures, and its economy was influenced 
strongly by relations with Europe. Most crucially, the controversial 1952 
reparations agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany awarded 
individuals and the Israeli state (until 1967) financial compensation for the 
Holocaust, which were paid until 1967 (Sachar 1999: 32–53). France provided 
crucial equipment to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and Israel’s budding 
nuclear programme (ibid.: 77–108). Until 1967, therefore, it could be argued 
that Israel was positioned on the cusp between the Middle East and Western 
Europe. 
 However, following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, its position changed. 
The collapse of the French-Israeli alliance, and the end of West German aid, 
weakened Western Europe’s influence. Concurrently, the US, under the Nixon 
administration, shifted its foreign policy focus towards the Soviet Union. In 
response to this reconfiguration, Israel and other proxies in the Third World 
assumed the role of preserving a regional balance of power favourable to 
American interests. This involved curbing Arab radicalism, of which the PLO 
was a part, and checking Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. As part of 
this endeavour, President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger advocated that the US should support Israel through the supply of 
arms, economic assistance and political patronage. Thus, Israel’s interests in 
the Arab world converged with the US administration’s interests in expelling 
the Soviets from the Middle East (Shlaim 2000: 309–10). Then, beginning in 
the mid-1970s, a series of agreements (1975, 1979, 1981) was forged 
establishing a strategic alliance between Israel and the US (Israeli MFAa; 
Israeli MFAb; Medzini 1988: 200–2). The significance of these agreements to 
the discussion in this chapter lies not so much in the political, military and 
economic support they guaranteed to Israel, but in the ushering in of a period of 
political and economic and military links with the US and the broader region 
that was to form the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). 
 As a result of the ongoing relations with Western European countries 
and deepening ties with the US, Israel, like other Cusp States, was straddling 
three regions. In security terms Israel was well rooted in the Middle East 
regional security complex; however, its political ideologies and identity were 
more aligned to Europe and NAFTA. Thus, Israeli official discourse, popular 
culture and media abound with references to Israel as the only democracy in 
the Middle East, as a ‘villa’ in the (Middle Eastern) ‘jungle’, and a bastion of 
the West (Eldar 2012). In institutional and economic terms, too, Israel is more 
fixed in Europe and NAFTA than in the Middle East. Israel enjoys Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) with North America and most of Western Europe, which 
accounts for nearly 80 per cent of Israel’s foreign trade. Israel has an 
association agreement with the European Union (EU) that exempts most 
Israeli-made products from import duty. It has FTAs with the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) countries and Turkey, and NAFTA (Israeli MFA 
2010). 
 Basic economic indicators also reflect the degree to which the Israeli 
economy resembles Western European, North American and European 
countries more than its neighbouring Middle East states. For instance, Israeli 
GDP per capita in 2011 was estimated at $31,400. The figure places Israel 
closer to per capita GDP levels in countries such as the United Kingdom 
($36,600), France ($35,600) and Spain ($31,000), than to her immediate 
neighbours Egypt ($6,600), Jordan ($6,000), Syria ($5,100) and Lebanon 
($15,700) (Central Intelligence Agency 2012). Israeli democracy, though 
compromised by its occupation of the West Bank, resembles the regimes in 
Western Europe and North America more than the authoritarian regimes of the 
Arab Middle East and Iran. Thus, organizations that monitor civil liberties 
around the world, such as Freedom House (2012), situate Israel alongside 
Western European and North American ‘free’ countries, while among Israel’s 
neighbours, Syria, Egypt and Jordan are defined as ‘not free’, and Lebanon as 
‘partially free’. A reflection of Israel’s strong institutional and economic 
rooting in Europe and North America can be seen in the country’s recent 
(2010) inclusion as a member in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD 2012). 
Triple gravitation and foreign policy towards the PLO after 
the Cold War 
The previous section explored the evolution and manifestations of Israel’s 
location on the cusp between the Middle East, Western Europe and North 
America. While the dynamics generated by security locate Israel firmly within 
the Middle Eastern security complex, there are economic, political and social 
ties to Western Europe and North America. The aim of the second section is to 
examine the links between this complex dynamic and Israeli foreign policy 
behaviour in relation to the PLO/PA. 
 Since the establishment of the PLO, towards the end of the Cold War, 
Israel has pursued the hard-line foreign policy stance of retaining all the 
territories seized in the 1967 war (rather than trading them for peace), has 
shown a tendency to use military force rather than diplomatic tools, and has 
rejected international initiatives aimed at addressing the conflict (Aran 2009: 
33–87). During the Cold War, especially from the early 1970s, Israel’s hard-
line foreign policy stance was compatible with its straddling of three regions. 
Although relations between the USSR and the PLO were often tense, Israel 
portrayed its confrontation with the organization, and the conflict between the 
West and the USSR, as linked. In particular, Israeli successes during conflicts 
with its enemies, including the PLO, weakened the Soviet’s allies and inflicted 
political and military damage to the USSR (Golan 1990). Crucially, from the 
late 1970s, foreign policy in relation to the PLO was the only arena where 
Israel could utilize military force extensively and routinely towards an actor 
ostensibly supported by the USSR; the peace agreement with Egypt was under 
way and, following the 1973 war, security arrangements along the border with 
Syria were in place. Of course, this hard-line stance had domestic 
consequences. The deepening occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
had the potential to increase tensions with Western Europe’s liberal, 
humanistic, normative values governing political conduct among states. 
Arguably, however, these tensions were dissipated by the Cold War security 
overlay, which linked Israel politically and militarily to the West. 
 The end of the Cold War prompted change. The link was broken 
between Israel’s aims to confront the PLO and the West’s goals related to 
confrontation with the USSR. Tensions persisted around maintaining a hard-
line stance and location on the cusp of the three regions. For example, it went 
against the ‘new world order’, announced by George H. Bush, in which 
international disputes would be settled by peaceful means. Also, the domestic 
consequences of maintaining this extreme position were increasingly at odds 
with Israel’s proclaimed institutional affinity with Western Europe and North 
America. Specifically, occupation of Palestine, especially amid the 1987 
Intifada, was challenged by the deeply embedded norms of liberal humanism 
and international peace that was supported by the expanding EU. The removal 
of the Cold War’s security overlay made these tensions more pronounced. 
 The confluence of the end of the Cold War and the restructuring in 1985 
of the Israeli economy through the Economic Emergency Stability Plan (EESP) 
produced a third tension. A detailed examination of the EESP is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say that it shifted the Israeli economy from 
being state-led and rent-based towards being market-driven and globally 
integrated. In this context, foreign direct investment from the European and 
North American economic subsystems, trade with these blocs, and the private 
sector’s ability to access foreign capital from global financial markets became 
the foundations of the new Israeli economy (Nitzan and Bichler 2002; Shalev 
2000). The changes prompted by the rise of this new economy, especially 
access to capital not linked to the state, endowed the Israeli private sector with 
an autonomy it had not previously had at its disposal. This coincided with the 
severe effects of the EESP on the decline of the state as the key tenet of the 
economy, and the rise of the private sector as the new economic engine (Shafir 
and Greenberg 2000: 103–127). Consequently, the political influence of the 
private sector extended to several spheres of activity, including foreign policy. 
 These economically driven changes that were pulling Israel towards 
Europe and North America were incongruent with Israel’s hard-line stance in 
the context of the Middle East regional security complex. The enduring conflict 
with the Arab states deterred foreign investors, who saw Israel’s unstable 
geopolitical environment and the possibility of an Arab boycott on companies 
doing business with Israel, as major problems. Also, Israel’s traditional foreign 
policy towards the PLO hindered the ability of domestic companies to 
penetrate the liberalizing markets of Asia (e.g. India). So long as the hard-line 
stance continued, the state and the emerging Israeli business class would be 
unable to realize the potential offered by Israel’s access to Western Europe and 
North America, and to integrate with the world economy. 
 Identity was also an issue. Until the early 1970s, Israel’s identity 
evolved around the notion of Mamlachtiyut, which celebrated images of the 
Lochem (Warrior), Tzabar (Jews rooted in the land), and more especially the 
state, as the central focuses of society, politics, economics and culture (Almog 
2004; Liebman and Don-Yihiyeh 1983: 81–131). However, from the mid-
1970s Mamlachtiyut had become weaker due in part to the growing military 
and political dependency on the US, which above all had the effect of eroding 
the notion of the state. Another reason was the declining economic and military 
performance of the Israeli state, which undermined the Zionist-Collectivist 
tenets of Mamlachtiyut. The multiple sub-state groups, such as the Jewish 
Settler Movement (Eldar and Zartal 2004), the Mizrachi Jews (Shalom-Chitrit 
2004), and Ultra-Orthodox Jews challenged the state over its various policies 
concerning war and peace, distribution of wealth, and the balance between the 
religious and secular interests in state, culture and society. 
 By the end of the Cold War, Israel was no longer defined by the 
hegemonic Zionist-Collectivist ethos of Mamlachtiyut: its Israeli identity was 
bifurcated. On the one hand, growing segments of society were seeking to fill 
the ‘Jewish vacuum’ left by the decline of Mamlachtiyut by espousing an 
increasingly religious, ethnic and nationalist credo. On the other hand, the 
effects produced by the restructuring of the economy through the EESP and the 
revolution in information technology were influencing the former Ashkenazi 
male, secular, nationalist elite who were now attracted to the impact of a 
hedonistic, capitalist, individualist, consumerist Western lifestyle (Ram 2007) 
For this influential group, the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly with 
the PLO, was an obstacle to realizing the life encapsulated by the Western-
influenced ethos, and their own financial aspirations. 
The responses by the policy-makers 
We have shown that following the end of the Cold War, Israel’s hard-line 
foreign policy was challenged by the several tensions generated by Israel’s 
location on the cusp of three regions. The hard-line stance it pursued towards 
the PLO in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ending of the Cold 
War, stood at odds with the new Israeli economy and some aspects of the 
newly emerging Israeli identity. The policy response and ideas promoted by the 
then Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, his Foreign Minister, Shimon 
Peres, and the then leader of the opposition Binyamin Netanyahu, were pivotal. 
None directly articulated a foreign policy agenda in the context of the tensions 
arising between maintaining a hard line towards the PLO and the Middle East 
security complex, and Israel’s position on the cusp. However, their discourse 
and foreign policy actions infer that their stance towards the PLO reflected the 
tensions generated by Israel’s position. 
 Rabin quickly recognized that the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between maintaining Israel’s hard-line stance in the context of the Middle East 
regional security complex, and a politico-military rooting in the West via the 
alliance with the US, had changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
He argued also that, given the West’s agenda of conflict resolution in, for 
example, Somalia and the Balkans, continuing conflict with the PLO would be 
at odds with Israel’s integration in Western Europe and North America. Rabin 
understood also that conflict with the PLO was an obstacle to Israel’s full 
exploitation of the economic ties being forged with Western Europe and North 
America, especially following the EESP. Finally, he saw conflict with the PLO 
as incongruent with the ethos that Israelis oriented towards Western Europe 
and the US had adopted. Rabin feared that the tenets of globalism, hedonism, 
individualism and consumerism would weaken the ability of Israeli society to 
cope with a protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. After some indecision and 
considerable reflection, Rabin shifted Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO 
from one of confrontation to one of political engagement to try to reconcile 
these tensions (Inbar 1999: 159–64; Makovski 1996). 
 Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was even more convinced than Rabin 
that Israel must reformulate its foreign policy towards the PLO. However, 
Peres sought not merely to reconcile the tensions generated by the hard-line 
stance and Israel’s location on the cusp. In his book, The New Middle East, 
Peres (1993) outlines a vision that involved redefining the regional 
underpinnings of the Middle East and Israel’s location within it. Peres wanted 
to use foreign policy change – a shift from conflict to political engagement 
with the PLO – to restructure the Middle Eastern regional framework. His 
vision was based on an assumption that political organization around a nation 
state was no longer sufficient to deal with the contemporary challenges facing 
human societies. He claimed that ‘only regional and supra-regional frameworks 
can provide the individual with security, livelihood, and freedom’ (Peres 1993: 
77–8). 
 Peres saw a number of trends fuelling this macro shift. The first was 
transformation of the political-security challenges facing states and societies. 
Peres contended that, previously, ‘the main conflicts were between people or 
states’ and that ‘[the] way to deal with an international conflict was by erecting 
an army, formulating a strategy, and resorting to the battlefield after exhausting 
all other options’. Employing similar methods in the face of the ‘new’ political 
and security challenges would be fruitless, in his view: 
There is no military answer to nuclear threat, there is no military 
answer to poverty and fundamentalism, there is no military answer 
to terrorism and there is no military answer to the destruction 
mankind inflicts on the ecology. We live in a world, which is 
confronted by new problems, yet employs old strategies. 
(Peres 1993: 78–9) 
In this new era, Peres envisaged national security requiring a system of 
regional security – implanted in a global framework. His conclusion was that 
‘an organisation for regional security combined with an organisation for global 
security is the course we need to pursue towards the twenty first century’ (ibid.: 
80). In other words, Peres saw expansion of Israel’s political and military 
embeddedness in the external sphere as the most feasible way of dealing with 
the contemporary security and political challenges. 
 In addition to generating changes in the political-security realm, Peres 
hoped to use foreign policy change to transform the socio-economic landscape 
of the Middle East. Specifically, he sought to move the Middle East out of 
what he considered to be a ‘war economy’. Defusing the conflict with the 
Palestinians and the Arab states was crucial for achieving this goal because ‘it 
would deprive the war economy of one of its main sources of legitimation’ 
(ibid.: 82–3). Peres hoped to create a regional open market economy to replace 
the war economy (ibid.). In the prevailing global economic competition, Peres 
contended that smaller markets were unviable as economic units, and did not 
‘generate sufficient capital for research and development and the 
manufacturing of new products’ (ibid.: 90). He conceived of a Middle East 
regional open market economy embedded in the global economic arena, 
particularly in terms of the ability to generate capital. In investing in 
infrastructure projects throughout the Middle East, multinational corporations 
and private banks, alongside the US, Japan and the EU, would constitute the 
main sources of incoming capital for the region. This investment in the Middle 
East would benefit the global economy by keeping oil prices stable and 
avoiding the costs of further eruptions of violence in the region (ibid.: 92–103). 
 For Peres, the establishment of a regional economic framework – 
implanted in the global economy – was not just an economic issue. By 
transforming the regional economy he hoped to ‘redeem’ the Middle East from 
religious fundamentalism and political instability. His account demonstrates his 
belief that the economic opportunities presented by globalization would 
generate a pacifying-secularizing political and social change. The incorporation 
of multilateral economic activity into foreign policy towards the PLO is 
conceived of here as a first attempt to set in place a tangible framework for a 
‘post-war economy’ of the Middle East. 
 A third view was being expressed within Israeli foreign policy circles – 
that of the then leader of the opposition, and future Prime Minister, Binyamin 
Netanyahu. In what is considered by many as a blueprint for policy-making, A 
Place Among the Nations (Netanyahu 1993) outlines Israel’s foreign policy 
towards the PLO, and its location on the cusp, as disconnected. Netanyahu does 
not devote space to reflecting on the possibility of tensions developing between 
these two elements, which suggests that, for him, they existed in parallel but 
were not interconnected. When asked whether he shared Peres’s vision of a 
New Middle East, he replied that ‘the notion was characteristic of people who 
live under continuous siege and want to change what is happening beyond their 
walls by imagining a different reality’ (Shlaim 2000: 574). 
Between vision and reality 
Rabin, Peres and Netanyahu had very different visions concerning the 
relationship between Israel’s location on the cusp and the foreign policy it 
pursued towards the PLO. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to 
evaluate the degree to which their policy positions were useful for dealing with 
the tensions ostensibly arising between Israel’s location on the cusp and its 
foreign policy. Undoubtedly, the plan outlined by Peres was the most ambitious 
of the three. It was designed not merely to reconcile the tensions that might 
have arisen between a continued hard-line stance towards the PLO and Israel’s 
straddling of three regions. It involved a historic shift that would result in Israel 
expanding its institutional and economic rooting in the Middle East, and 
transforming the economic, institutional and ideational regional underpinnings 
of the Middle East region. For instance, a transformation from virtually no 
economic cooperation to economic interdependence, from a regional identity 
based on mutual exclusion to an identity with regional integration, and from a 
region characterized by institutions promoting state interests to one 
characterized by institutions fostering cooperation. 
 There were initial signs that the vision of the ‘New Middle East’ might 
materialize. Three regional meetings – the 1994, 1995 and 1996 Middle East 
and North Africa economic forums – were convened following the signing of 
the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO, which 
entailed mutual recognition and a very limited transfer of power from Israel to 
the PA. The meetings brought together Israel, various Arab countries, and 
some external parties, to discuss the development of regional economic 
frameworks. However, a number of factors rendered the effort to shift Israel’s 
location on the cusp in the context of creating a ‘new Middle East’ still-born. 
One was that the Israeli business community was not interested in integration 
in the new Middle Eastern economic framework. Instead, the mould with the 
PLO having been broken, and the secondary and tertiary Arab boycotts against 
Israel having been dissolved, the business community was focused on the 
economic possibilities beyond the Middle East that would be facilitated by 
Israeli foreign policy reformulation. This included entering markets such as 
India, China and other emerging South East Asian countries, to which Israeli 
firms now had access. It also emphasized a strengthening of relations with 
partners such as Japan, which, prior to the Oslo agreements, had been low 
profile in terms of links with Israeli companies (Bouillon 2004: 52–4; 131–2). 
Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, Israel was engaged in a concerted effort to 
deepen its economic ties with the US and Western Europe. 
 Another reason why this effort failed was that the notion of a new 
Middle East was opposed by ethno-centric, religious and nationalistic domestic 
groups within Israel, which still considered the Middle East a hostile domain 
(Ben-Ami 1998: 336–8). Likewise, societal groups throughout the Arab world 
were deeply opposed to the proposed shift in Israel’s location on the cusp 
through its integration into the new regional frameworks envisaged by Peres. 
Indicatively, the introduction to the Arab translation of Peres’s book (Cairo: El-
Ahram, 1995) claims that: 
 When the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were discovered about 200 
years ago by a French woman and disseminated in mans’ languages, including 
Arabic, the international Zionist establishment tried its best to deny the plot. 
They even claimed that it was fabricated and sought to acquire all the copies on 
the market in order to prevent them from being read. And now, it is precisely 
Shimon Peres who brings the cutting proof of their validity. His book [The New 
Middle East] confirms in so clear a way that it cannot be denied that the 
Protocols were true indeed. Peres’s book is yet another step in the execution of 
these dangerous plots (Quoted in Arnon Regular 1994: 35).  
 Third, the ongoing deterioration of the Oslo Process after Prime Minster 
Rabin’s assassination in November 1995 had halted the effort to generate a 
regional economic framework. The election of Binyamin Netanyahu in May 
1996 dealt another severe blow to the process. 
 From the perspective of the interplay between foreign policy and the 
location of Israel on the cusp it is interesting to reflect on the failure of the 
vision of the New Middle East to materialize. It hinged on two issues; first, the 
difficulties entailed by attempting to shift the balance of location on the cusp 
from certain regional frameworks to others. In the case of Israel, the proposed 
reformulation of foreign policy towards the PLO was not sufficient to shift the 
economic, social and cultural rooting of Israel in Western Europe and North 
America to the Middle East. Domestic opposition within Israel and the Arab 
world, plus the decline and collapse of the peace process, were constraining 
factors. Second, the particular attributes of the Middle East – low levels of 
trade, lack of a common and inclusive identity, weak and exclusive regional 
institutions – were further obstacles. A close examination of Peres’s blueprint 
suggests that he did not foresee these problems. He was mistaken in thinking 
that economic activity in and of itself could reverse the patterns of behaviour 
that had become entrenched in Israel, and the region more generally, regarding 
the location of Israel on the cusp and the regional attributes of the Middle East. 
 The flaws in Peres’s plan did not extend to the vision developed by 
Rabin. He did not envisage using the reformulation of Israeli foreign policy 
towards the PLO to set in motion a historical shift in the location of Israel on 
the cusp towards further embedding it in the Middle East. Rather, his vision 
involved relatively moderate foreign policy recalibration – political 
engagement falling far short of a peace agreement and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state – to reconcile the tensions arising from the long-held hard-line 
stance towards the PLO and Israel’s location on the cusp in a post Cold War 
environment. The balance between Israel’s political, social and economic ties 
to Western Europe and North America, and the security logic tying Israel to the 
Middle East, would remain unchanged. That said, he hoped that the Israeli 
modus operandi vis-a-vis the Middle Eastern security complex would change 
from conflict to cooperation. But as a result of the collapse of the Oslo Process, 
the goal pursued by both Peres and Rabin – that of changing Israel’s 
relationship with the Middle East from one of conflict to one of cooperation – 
remained unachieved. 
 However, Israel’s partial change in foreign policy reconciled the 
tensions that were generated by its hard-line stance and its rooting in Western 
Europe and North America. As mentioned earlier, in the wake of the Oslo 
Process Israel deepened its institutional and economic ties with the EU and 
North America, and the volume of its economic activity increased 
substantially. Was this vindication of the vision espoused by Binyamin 
Netanyahu, which rendered Israel’s location on the cusp and its foreign policy 
towards the PLO/PA disconnected? In my view, not necessarily. The ability to 
reap material benefits by reconciling the tensions between the hard-line stance 
and Israel’s location on the cusp in a post-Cold War context was enabled by the 
response of Israel’s Western European and North American partners to the 
partial reformulation of its foreign policy towards the PLO. Rather than tying 
the material benefits afforded to Israel to successful completion of the peace 
process, Israel benefited from what can be described as ‘process dividends’. 
Favourable trade agreements, access to financial markets, improved political 
relations, etc., were granted to Israel in order to keep the peace process intact, 
even though from the mid-1990s the prospects for securing an Israeli-
Palestinian peace had been fading. Thus, notwithstanding his earlier 
convictions, even Netanyahu was unable to pursue a foreign policy towards the 
PLO that remained independent of forces that were pulling and pushing Israel 
away from and towards the Middle Eastern regional security system, Europe 
and North America (Lochery 1999). 
 However, the deepening material ties between Israel, Europe, and North 
America, reflect only part of the picture of Israel’s position on the cusp since 
the end of the Cold War. The trend of deepening material ties has been 
countered by a growing critique of Israel from Western European civil society 
and, increasingly, North America. Calls to boycott Israeli academia, consistent 
low ranking of Israel in international public opinion polls (Ravid 2012), and 
criticism of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians in mainstream US 
broadsheets including the New York Times (Friedman 2012), are indicative of 
this trend. It is questionable whether failure to enact even the modest foreign 
policy change that Rabin had in mind will suffice in the long run to reconcile 
tensions generated by the deepening occupation of the Palestinians, on the one 
hand, and the normative geography of Europe and the US on the other; and 
thus, by implication, the continuing location of Israel on the cusp. Time will 
tell.  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO in light of the 
former’s position on the cusp between three regions. As part of my conclusion 
I want to raise three major issues that link the Israeli case with the broader 
discussion of states on the cusp. First, examining Israel through the lens of 
states on the cusp helps to identify the country as being similar to those other 
states, rather than being an idiosyncratic case. Like other Cusp States, Israel 
straddles a number of regions, which since the early 1970s has included the 
Middle East, Western Europe and North America. While Israel is firmly 
positioned in the Middle East regional security complex, its ideology, 
institutional make-up and economy are more akin to those of Europe and North 
America. Like other Cusp States Israel is strategically important to all three 
regions, albeit in different ways. Finally, issues related to identity and culture 
impose a ceiling on the degree to which Israel can become fully integrated into 
any of the three regions it straddles. 
 Another issue is the relationship between location on the cusp and 
foreign policy. At times this relationship is synergistic. For instance, during the 
Cold War Israel’s hard-line position was compatible with this straddling of 
three regimes. However, tensions can also arise. The changes generated by the 
end of the Cold War promoted a number of tensions and meant Israel’s hard-
line stance was increasingly incongruent with its political ties to Europe and 
North America, and its newly evolving economic ties following successful 
implementation of the EESP. Hence, prospects for the Israeli economy being 
integrated into the global economy were hindered by the former’s conflict with 
the PLO. Also, a growing number of segments in Israel, especially the 
erstwhile Ashkenazi – secular, male, nationalist elites – began to adopt a 
Western-influenced ethos. This culture was less congruent with the political 
and security dynamics generated by Israel’s enduring conflict with the PLO, 
and the Arab world more broadly. 
 We identified three foreign policy responses to these growing tensions. 
Prime Minister Rabin instituted a partial foreign policy change to reconcile the 
tensions emerging between the hard-line stance towards the PLO and Israel’s 
relations with Europe and North America – which was the most effective 
response. The vision and practice that Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was keen 
to pursue was hampered by opposition from within Israel, and the region, to the 
shifting of the historic balance towards a greater deep rootedness in the Middle 
East. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s notion that Israeli foreign policy towards the 
PLO and its location on the cusp were disconnected also seems flawed. 
Therefore, notwithstanding his earlier convictions, Netanyahu did not formally 
end the Oslo Process. Rather, he unpicked the process gradually, thereby 
ensuring that Israel’s ‘process dividends’ remained intact. Thus, the case of 
Israel highlights a third issue: the ability to use foreign policy change to affect 
the location of a state on the cusp. The discussion above suggests that foreign 
policy change might prove useful for reconciling tensions between a particular 
foreign policy stance and the effects generated by the location on the cusp. 
However, setting in motion shifts from one side of the cusp to another, may 
prove more difficult because of the domestic opposition, resistance from within 
one or more regions to the proposed change, and the fact that the regional 
frameworks are not ready to accommodate the proposed shift. 
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